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Abstract: In this article, I develop a Gandhian perspective on animal liberation. 
Indeed, I argue, against Gandhi himself, the traditional Hindu theory of the 
purusharthas, or goals of life, applies to non-human as well as human animals. In 
this respect, I adapt Parel’s reading of Gandhi as reinterpreting the purusharthas 
through the philosophy of non-violence. In this reinterpretation, Gandhi, regards 
political freedom (swaraj) as the means to spiritual freedom (moksha). Gandhi is 
already an animal liberationist in the sense of advocating liberation for animals 
from violence and exploitation by humans. However, he does not also embrace the 
political turn in animal ethics, asserting that domesticated animals are co-citizens 
of the mixed polity. I further reinterpret the purusharthas through Gandhi’s 
philosophy of non-violence to embrace this political turn. This combines three 
forms of liberation: negative freedom from exploitation, positive freedom to be a 
political participant, and freedom as spiritual growth and self-development. Not 
only does my argument provide a novel Gandhian perspective on animal liberation. 
It also challenges the political turn in animal ethics to embrace Gandhi’s notion of 
spiritual liberation as a goal of life for the mixed, interspecies polity.  
 
Introduction 
 
Despite having developed a sophisticated philosophy of non-violence extending to 
non-human animals (henceforth animals), Gandhi has been treated with remarkable 
indifference by Western animal liberationists. This is surprising indeed. Like Western 
animal liberationists (Singer 1995, Regan 2004), Gandhi adopted a resolutely 
abolitionist position. Gandhi’s concept of non-violence entails much more than 
protecting animal welfare, while also leaving animals under the butcher’s knife. It 
demands abolishing the institutions and practices of animal slaughter. This is likewise 
the defining claim of the Western animal liberation movement: the abolition of all 
forms of animal exploitation, including slaughter and vivisection, thereby liberating 
animal lives from exploitation by humans. Nevertheless, animal ethics in the West has 
taken a new turn towards political theory. This political turn (Donaldson and 
Kymlicka, 2011) goes beyond the emphasis on abolition as liberation from 
exploitation and use. It conceives of domesticated animals themselves as political 
agents. Hence, ‘liberation’ for animals is not simply negative freedom from 
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exploitation by humans, but also a positive political freedom realized through their 
participation in shaping the norms of a mixed or interspecies polity, as co-citizens.   
In this article, I ask whether Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence could embrace 
animal liberation as encompassing positive participation by animals in political life, 
characteristic of the turn. If so, this would not only combine the negative freedom of 
animals from exploitation by humans with their positive political freedom to 
participate as co-citizens of the polity. It would also combine these two freedoms with 
a third kind: that is, a positive spiritual freedom to experiment with new forms of 
companionship and cooperation, thereby expanding the circle of interconnectedness 
with others of the same and different species. Nevertheless, this combination of the 
‘three freedoms’ -- freedom from exploitation, freedom to participate as a co-citizen 
of the polity, and freedom to grow spiritually in an enriched and expanded community 
-- fundamentally challenges a key feature of Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence. 
Gandhi insists on the differentia specifica of humans as their unique capacity to attain 
the third freedom, spiritual freedom or moksha: “No brute could ever aspire to 
moksha” (Parel, 2006, 22). Moreover, he makes this claim about moksha as the 
differentia specifica of humanity in the context of reinterpreting the traditional Indian 
doctrine of the purusharthas, or goals of life.  
Indeed, the theoretical basis of Gandhi’s reinterpretation of the purusharthas is 
that political freedom (swaraj) is “the very means” (Ibid, 15) to spiritual liberation: in 
other words, swaraj is the route to moksha. With this in mind, I ask a further question: 
viz., should the political turn embrace the idea that animals are not only the subjects 
of political but also spiritual liberation? As I show, some turn theorists (for example, 
Smith, 2012) appeal to the idea that recognizing the political status of domesticated 
animals is a means to human ‘spiritual’ self-development, in an expanded and 
restored community. Nevertheless, they do not extend this same insight into the 
prospects for such self-development to its animal members. This creates a lacuna in 
the political turn; a failure to account for the spiritual dimension of political freedom 
for animals, and not just humans. If, contrary to Gandhi himself, it can be 
demonstrated that the life goals of purusharthas apply equally to animals and 
humans, then the political turn could also be a spiritual turn.     
I proceed in the following steps. First, I lay out Gandhi’s reinterpretation of the 
purusharthas. Second, I briefly consider the relationship between political and 
spiritual freedom before, third, inquiring into the relationship of his philosophy of 
non-violence and animal liberationism. Fourth, I consider the possibility of Gandhi 
taking a political turn, going beyond his commitments to compassion for all suffering 
creatures and its reconciliation with economic power (artha) to endorsing animals as 
co-citizens, capable of attaining political freedom (swaraj). Fifth, I consider whether 
spiritual freedom (moksha) is plausibly an interspecies goal of the purusharthas, one 
turn theorists could embrace as filling a lacuna in their program.   
My contribution in this article consists in opening an East/West dialogue on human 
relations with animals.  If, contrary to Gandhi himself, the life goals of the 
purusharthas apply equally to animals and humans, then Western animal ethicists 
gain a valuable resource for thinking through, more completely and consistently, the 
implications of liberating animals. That is, liberating animals, not just from 
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exploitation but also, to participate politically, and, as such, to liberate themselves -- 
and not just humans -- spiritually, in an expanded and restored community of all 
suffering life.    
 
I.  Purusharthas Paradigms, Old and New 
 
 Indeed, I approach Gandhi’s philosophy of non-violence through Parel’s notion of a 
new Gandhian paradigm. This reinterprets the traditional Indian theory of the 
purusharthas or aims of life. These aims are as follows: ethics and religion (dharma), 
wealth and power (artha), pleasure (kama), and spiritual liberation or transcendence 
(moksha). Etymologically, purusha means ‘immaterial spirit’ while artha means ‘for 
the sake of.’ Hence, purushartha means, “that which is done for the sake of the 
immaterial spirit” (Parel, 2008, 46). Indeed, in Indian philosophical anthropology, 
humans are composites of their biological/material nature (prakriti) and spirit 
(purusha). Granted, the body has its relatively autonomous purposes, but these 
acquire their “full human significance” (Ibid) only by reference to the purusha or 
spirit. To this extent, any human activity that deliberately excludes reference to the 
purusharthas, and the ultimate aim of spiritual liberation (moksha), is “considered pro 
tanto, not beneficial to human well-being” (Ibid).   
What, though, is new about Gandhi’s ‘new paradigm’?  How does it differ from 
the traditional theory of the purusharthas?  The traditional theory embeds the 
purusharthas as the last of four elements in the canon of Indian political thought, 
dating from the fourth century BC. The first of these elements was the plurality of 
sciences necessary for human flourishing, including philosophy, the Vedic science of 
revealed truths, political science, and economics; the second was monarchy as the 
normal form of government; the third was a hierarchical order of society based on 
caste. Indeed, these three elements created the general cultural conditions necessary to 
pursue the purusharthas. The first element is entirely benign from Gandhi’s point of 
view: including the science of revealed truth in the plurality of science is essential to 
realizing the goal of spiritual liberation. However, the second and third elements are 
anything but benign.  
Indeed, monarchy and caste embed the purusharthas in structures of state and 
cultural violence. On the one hand, in foreign policy, monarchy links the goal of 
wealth and power to an imperial war-system. The monarch was responsible for “the 
acquisition of things not possessed, the preservation of things possessed, and the 
augmentation of things preserved, and the bestowal of things augmented on a worthy 
recipient.  On it is dependent the orderly maintenance of worldly life” (op. cit., 45). In 
other words, to the extent that it requires order and stability, even spiritual freedom or 
transcendence depends on imperial conquest and expansion: state violence. On the 
other hand, in domestic policy, monarchy links the enforcement of order and stability 
to social caste. Thus, hierarchy based on caste restricts ‘untouchables’ from 
effectively pursuing the aims of life necessary for human flourishing: cultural 
violence. In both respects, the purusharthas entail social structures that are 
profoundly violent and therefore -- in Gandhi’s estimation -- pro tanto not beneficial 
to human flourishing.  
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From the eleventh century onwards, the ultimate goal of spiritual liberation was 
detached from political science. Instead, liberation required withdrawal from politics 
and worldly affairs. Not only did this produce disharmony in the plurality of sciences 
by detaching revealed truth from political science and economics, but also it resulted 
in a stagnation of Indian political thought lasting well into the modern age (Parel, 
2006 & 2008). Indeed, Gandhi’s new paradigm corrects for this stagnation by 
detaching the purusharthas from the structures of state and cultural violence. In this 
respect, he reinterpreted the purusharthas through a concept of non-violence (ahimsa) 
that ties spiritual liberation through experiential knowledge of revealed truth to 
political liberation (swaraj). This reinterpretation involved a highly complex synthesis 
of Hinduism, Tolstoyan Christianity, and Western political liberalism (see Gray and 
Hughes, 2015, also see Allen, 2018). While beyond the scope of my present inquiry to 
unpack fully this synthesis, I take the following as its gist.   
All individuals are capable of engaging in experiments with Truth. Indeed, Truth 
(which is also God) is revealed not through divine intervention, but rather personal 
experience or ‘seeing.’ In other words, Truth is not, in the first instance, a function of 
the divine any more than it is a function of human rationality or reason. Indeed, 
human reason plays only a secondary role in interpreting experience. This is 
consistent with the plurality of sciences, in which philosophy as the means of 
reasoning (Parel, 2008, also see Halbfass, 1988) investigates the internal structure of 
the other sciences, including that of experientially revealed Truth. Nevertheless, Truth 
(as simultaneously God) is also Love. Viz., no individual self (atman) as Truth seeker 
is an isolated social atom, whose particular experiments with Truth/God fail to 
connect with the experiences of others. On the contrary, each individual is -- 
metaphorically speaking -- a drop in the ocean of universal Love (Gray and Hughes, 
2015), thereby connecting each to all others (the interconnected whole of God/Truth, 
or brahman).  
Regarding this confluence of God/Truth/Love, Gandhi contended that the “only 
means to Truth [God and Love] is Ahimsa” (op. cit., 184), or non-violence. No 
individual experience of Truth/God/Love is possible through the prevailing structures 
of state and cultural violence. For Gandhi, this meant that the legitimacy of the state, 
in addition to culture generally, depends on broad or majority public commitment to 
non-violence. Consequently, non-violence becomes the standard of both state and 
cultural legitimacy. Civic nationalism replaces monarchy and the imperial war-
system. Indeed, in foreign policy, the legitimacy of the civic national state depends on 
the majority of its people repudiating cross-border aggression and expansionism 
(Parel, 2006 & 2008). In domestic policy, its legitimacy depends on a majority 
respecting one another’s human rights to conduct and pursue their own experiments 
with Truth, working from diverse starting points in different cultural traditions, 
religious or secular (Grier, 2003, Lal, 2016). Overall, then, such egalitarian 
commitments by the majority to state and cultural non-violence -- as opposed to 
aggression and hierarchy -- become the conditions necessary for individual Truth 
seekers to pursue the purusharthas, and the ultimate goal of spiritual liberation.   
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II. Political and Spiritual Freedom 
 
That said, however, what exactly is the bearing of Gandhi’s extending the state and 
cultural legitimacy standard of non-violence to animals?  Indeed, his reinterpretation 
of the purusharthas takes political freedom -- national and individual self-
determination (swaraj) -- as the means to spiritual liberation. In this respect, however, 
he contends that such liberation or moksha, attained through political activity, is the 
differentia specifica of humanity. Here, I note a potential ambiguity in Gandhi’s claim 
about the differentia specifica. On the one hand, does he mean that animals are 
incapable of spiritual freedom because they are incapable of political freedom?  If this 
is the case, then the differentia specifica of humanity is both political types of 
freedom, political and spiritual. Or, on the other hand, does he mean that spiritual 
freedom alone distinguishes humans from animals?  If this were the case, then he 
would presumably allow that one could talk meaningfully about animals’ political 
liberation, while denying this is a means to their spiritual liberation.  
One might take much of what Gandhi says about animals as supporting the first 
view: that they are capable of neither political nor spiritual liberation. At times, he 
refers to animals as dumb brutes, attributing the origins of humanity’s violent 
dispositions to the law of the beast, as defined by submission to predatory forces 
(Burgat, 2004). Indeed, in his own words, “Man has by painful striving to surmount 
and survive the animal in him […].  Man must, therefore, if he is to realize his dignity 
and his own mission, cease to take part in the destruction and refuse to prey upon his 
weaker fellow creatures” (Ibid, op. cit., 230). In other words, as dumb brutes, animals 
are incapable of self-determination (swaraj) in light of a moral commitment to non-
violence. That said, however, Gandhi also appeals to the cow as a “poem of pity” (op. 
cit., 231), symbol of nature as nourishing mother. Viz., “Cow-protection to me … 
means protection of all that lives and is helpless and weak in the world” (Ibid).  
Such an appeal to animals as helpless and weak, rather than violent and 
predatory, obviously does nothing to contradict the view that animals are incapable of 
political freedom. Indeed, anything but positively self-determining, helpless and weak 
animals become the passive objects of human compassion and responsibility. 
Nevertheless, extending non-violence to animals does confer profound negative duties 
on humans. In particular, it confers on them negative duties to abolish hunting, 
butchery, and vivisection. How, though, does Gandhi’s appeal to non-violence 
compare with Western animal liberationism?  I next inquire into these similarities and 
differences. 
 
III. Gandhi’s Non-Violence and Western Animal Liberationism 
 
Indeed, resulting in negative duties of abolitionism, Gandhi’s extension of non-
violence to animals appears strongly aligned with Western animal liberationism. 
Liberationists are likewise committed to a generalized ethic of non-violence, applying 
to animals as well as humans (Pellow, 2014, Francione and Charlton, 2015). They are 
further committed to extensive programs of abolitionism, freeing animals from 
exploitation and use by humans, in zoos, factory farms, scientific research facilities, 
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and so on (Giroux, 2016).  Nevertheless, important differences emerge between the 
Gandhian and Western liberationist commitments to non-violence and abolitionism.  
In particular, Western animal liberationism is premised on rejecting any claims about 
the differentia specifica of humanity. To be sure, like the Indian tradition criticized by 
Gandhi, Western religious and moral traditions also make such a claim distinguishing 
humans from animals. However, they identify the differentia specifica with human 
reason and rationality, as opposed to spirituality and transcendence. This is evident in 
the Abrahamic religious traditions of the West, according to which rational humanity 
rightfully exercises dominion over dumb creation, justifying violence to animals for 
human ends (Kymlicka and Donaldson, 2014).    
Indeed, denouncing such violence, Western liberationists stress animals and 
humans are more different in degree than kind. As such, they apply non-violence to 
animals based not on difference -- as Gandhi had done in reinterpreting the 
purusharthas -- but rather commonality with humans. Hence, both animals and 
humans are sentient (Singer, 1995), equally capable of pleasure and pain. Moreover, 
both typically have interests (Feinberg, 1974) in enjoying the one while avoiding the 
other. Consequently, liberationists advocate equal consideration for sentience-based 
interests of all animal life (Cochrane, 2012). However, this egalitarian stress on equal 
considerability, across species lines, is surely just as much a repudiation of Gandhi’s 
own hierarchical appeal to spirituality over rationality as alternative differentia 
specifica of humanity in Indian tradition, as opposed to Western Abrahamic religions 
and Marxism.   
In sum, Gandhi and Western animal liberationists could agree on liberating 
suffering animals from exploitation and use by humans through satisfying negative 
duties of abolition.  Further, neither take a stand on whether animals are capable of 
active political participation; neither, in other words, take a political turn towards 
endorsing animal co-citizenship. What, though, might one say about the most 
distinctive Gandhian claim, regarding the extension of non-violence to animals and 
humanity’s spiritual progress? One might expect animal liberationists to take a dim 
view of this aspect of Gandhi’s thought. After all, one might think that asserting 
humanity’s spiritual freedom, while denying any equivalent progress for animals, 
contradicts Western animal liberationists’ species egalitarianism. 
Nevertheless, that is rather hasty. Equal consideration of interests in not suffering 
is not the same as having equal interests (Singer, 1995). Western liberationists might 
agree with Gandhi that animals are incapable of spiritual liberation and, as such, have 
no interest in moksha. To be sure, they should repudiate Gandhi’s demeaning 
language about the animal origins of human violence and humans having to overcome 
the animal in them. That said, however, they can still reconcile with Gandhi to the 
extent he is a species egalitarian where it really counts equal consideration for animal 
suffering. It is not morally objectionable to say animals have no interest in moksha 
than it is to say they have no interest in voting or holding elected office (Cochrane, 
2012). Indeed, such differences have no bearing on the extension of non-violence to 
animals or the imperative of abolitionism.   
Moreover, liberationists might then say, ‘We can agree with Gandhi that humans 
might well benefit spiritually from satisfying abolitionist duties.’ Abolitionism 
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presents a radical challenge to the materialism of modern society. Indeed, abolishing 
the capitalist industrial meat production system demands repudiating enormous 
profits, and the easy satisfactory of popular dietary preferences, at the expense of 
suffering animals. To this extent, Western animal liberationists could accommodate, 
at least, some of Gandhi’s distinctive claim regarding non-violence -- extended to 
animals -- and the spiritual progress of humanity. At the very least, they could 
embrace a broad conception of human spirituality as transcending majority 
acceptance of violence to animals for human ends. That, however, leaves unanswered 
the question of any possible Gandhian endorsement of a political turn to regarding 
animals as co-citizens. 
 
IV. Could Gandhi make a Political Turn? 
 
By contrast with the animal liberationist emphasis on negative duties to abolish all 
social institutions that dominate and exploit animals, the political turn in animal ethics 
is defined, in large part, by its ascription of positive citizenship rights to animals 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011, Smith, 2012). To be sure, not all animals can or 
should be our co-citizens. If submitted to predatory forces of the law of beasts, many 
wild animals are also members of independent self-governing communities. Indeed, 
the value of sovereignty confers on humans both negative duties of non-interference 
and positive duties of assistance, for instance, when natural calamities threaten the 
sovereign integrity of such communities. Further, many animals occupy a liminal 
position in relation to humans, having adapted to living alongside human settlements, 
but without becoming co-participants in human households or other social 
institutions. Humans owe them recognition of their right to be present in and around 
human settlements, while also respecting that they otherwise lead substantially 
independent lives.   
Nevertheless, humans breed and socialize domesticated animals to be participants 
in social institutions, ranging from households to farms, in addition to public health 
and security institutions (Garner and O’Sullivan, 2016). Indeed, domestication 
establishes a special relationship of co-membership in the mixed polity, or Zoopolis 
(Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2011). Prima facie, however, such a relationship is quite 
different from that envisaged by Gandhi to the domestic cow, as poem of pity. Gandhi 
did not regard the cow as a self-determining (swaraj) citizen of the civic 
constitutional national state. Instead, he regarded the cow, and domesticated animals 
generally, as objects of compassion and responsibility by human citizens, for whom 
extending non-violence to animals is a condition of their spiritual progress (moksha). 
To this extent, one might think that a political turn, for Gandhi, is not in the cards.  
That said, however, Gandhi also devoted considerable attention throughout his 
life to rethinking non-violent human social relations with domesticated animals not in 
terms of political or spiritual freedoms, but rather an alliance of ethics and economics 
(Burgat, 2004), or, in the language of the purusharthas, wealth and power (artha). In 
particular, he sought to redesign animal husbandry saving cows from the butcher’s 
knife. This meant their “slaughter should become expensive and useless” (Ibid, 242), 
indeed doing nothing to maximize the wealth and power of self-determining citizens 
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seeking Truth/God/Love. According to Gandhi, slaughter can be avoided, thereby 
meeting the ethical imperative of non-violence, by using all parts of husbanded 
animals while they are alive and following their natural deaths. To this extent, he 
stressed the economic value of non-violent animal products (ahinsak), ranging from 
milk, urine, and dung, to ahinsak leather products developed from the carcasses of 
animals that had died naturally, rather than slaughtered for their hides.  
Indeed, a significant part of Gandhi’s reform of animal husbandry consisted in 
the reform of traditional Indian social institutions providing homes or shelters 
(goshalas and pinjrapoles) for stay or abandoned animals, or those otherwise bound 
for the abattoir. Not only should these institutions be reformed to provide an 
educational function in teaching citizens about the ethical imperative of non-violence, 
but also, they should be made economically productive by having dairies and 
tanneries attached to them. Above all, Gandhi’s alliance of ethics (dharma) and 
economic (artha) is based on a rather hard-headed recognition that citizens must fully 
integrate husbanded animals into society, as economically productive social members. 
Unless they are economically productive, such animals are unlikely to become the 
beneficiaries of non-violence, undermining the spiritual progress of humanity.   
In this respect, Gandhi clearly sees helpless and suffering domesticated animals 
as more than just a poem of pity. They are also essential to one of the goals of life 
identified in the theory of the purusharthas: that is, non-violent forms of wealth and 
power (artha) as a condition of citizens’ spiritual liberation (moksha). Nevertheless, 
his ‘economic turn’ in animal ethics still fails to engage with the idea of animals 
themselves as co-citizens. In other words, his economic turn is not also a political 
turn. However, Gandhi might be justly criticized for not engaging with the political 
dimensions of human relations to domesticated animals. Part of his discussion of the 
reform of animal husbandry addresses the cultural violence of social caste. In addition 
to protecting vulnerable animals, the reforms address social and religious stigma 
against untouchables. Indeed, they should be adequately compensated by the state for 
skinning dead animals and for the profits derived from exploiting the different parts 
of the carcasses (Burgat, 2004).     
Gandhi, though, does not consider that animals themselves remain another kind 
of social caste. However, the ongoing caste status of domesticated animals is the 
primary insight of the political turn (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2015). In this respect, 
turn theorists argue by analogy not with untouchables but rather people with 
disabilities. The disability rights movement in the West has adopted a 3P model of 
liberation: protection, provision, and participation. Viz., liberation for people with 
disabilities entails not just protection against overt abuse and provision of material 
resources, but also participation in rule making. Indeed, without participation in 
shaping the rules of social cooperation, people with disabilities necessarily remain 
second-class citizens, or wards of the state. Gandhi’s civic national state extends the 
third P to untouchables, guaranteeing their political liberation (swaraj) as self-
determining citizens.   
Nevertheless, it does not consider any such extension to domesticated animals, 
leaving them passive recipients of protection and provision. Hence, from the 
perspective of Western turn theorists, Gandhi’s reforms of animal husbandry treat 
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domesticated animals unjustly, reducing them to second class citizens, despite its 
positive reformist guarantee of the first two Ps. I ask, however, whether he could also 
extend the third P to domesticated animals, regarding them as co-citizens. To answer 
this question, I consider the case developed by turn theorists for extending positive 
participation rights as citizens to domesticated animals, before asking whether this 
could be acceptable to Gandhi, and whether he should further adapt the theory of the 
purusharthas to include domesticated animals.  
The disability rights movements articulate two major objections to denying 
participation rights to persons with disabilities. (1) Those responsible for 
administering the first two Ps to such persons deny them “opportunities for mobility, 
exploration, choice, learning, challenge -- all potentially crucial to well-being” 
(Donaldson & Kymlicka 2015b, 327). (2) This leads to ‘oppressive terms of 
cooperation … set unilaterally by one party, which makes unfairness in benefits and 
burdens virtually inevitable’ (Ibid). Clearly, Gandhi’s reforms of animal husbandry 
are vulnerable to these objections. While seeing animals as subjects of compassion, 
Gandhi says nothing about humans owing them opportunities for mobility, 
exploration, choice, learning, and so on. Instead, he justifies his reforms unilaterally 
in terms of economic benefits to humans. Domesticated animals continue to work for 
human benefit. Nevertheless, Gandhi says nothing that would indicates he recognizes 
the need to justify these arrangements as ‘fair’ to the animals themselves, in light of 
any such range of social opportunities.   
That said, however, participation overcomes the above objections only insofar as 
it entails a “new conception of political agency” (Ibid, 331). This conception of 
political agency is new in that it departs from the traditional “ideal of an articulate, 
autonomous agent engaged in public reason in the public square” (Ibid) by virtue of 
the “ability to articulate and understand propositions” (Kymlicka & Donaldson, 
2014). Moreover, the traditional ideal demands political agents satisfy a “threshold 
individual capacity for rational reflection and public deliberation” (Ibid). This, 
however, leaves open the door to a Gandhian endorsement of the political agency of 
domesticated animals. As I have stressed all along, Gandhi denies the differentia 
specifica for humans is rationality. Nevertheless, turn theorists must give an 
appropriate account of how they could participate in shaping the terms of cooperation 
for the polity: in other words, how such animals could exercise political freedom 
(swaraj).  
Here, turn theorists stress that failure to meet the rationality threshold is no more 
an impediment to political agency and participation for animals than it is for many 
humans, such as those with severe cognitive disabilities. Political agency may be 
expressed not only through ‘our conscious minds’ but also our ‘bodily life’ (Krause 
2011, 317). Further, capacities for agency are always ‘socially sustained’ and 
distributed (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2015a, 331; also see their 2015b and 2014). 
Whether expressed through our conscious minds or our bodies, agency ‘emerges out 
of the communicative exchanges, background meanings, social interpretations, 
personal intentions, self-understandings, and bodily encounters through which one’s 
identity is manifest through one’s deeds’ (Krause 2011, 317). To this extent, agents 
are interdependent rather than independent, indeed requiring the help (Francis & 
86 MICHAEL ALLEN 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
Silvers, 2007, Meijer, 2013) of others to express their agency through such 
multifarious exchanges and encounters.  
This is surely consonant with Gandhi’s conception of Truth/God/Love in which 
all individual selves (atman) are interconnected. In the mixed or interspecies polity, 
domesticated animals are political agents by virtue of their capacities for non-
linguistic “internatural” communication with humans (von Essen & Allen, 2017). 
Nevertheless, humans are obliged by the non-linguistic character of their 
communicative exchanges and encounters with such animals to bring “citizenship into 
the spaces where membership and participation are meaningful” to them as social 
members and participants. For example, Donaldson and Kymlicka appeal to three 
illustrative cases, city dog parks, animal assisted therapy (AAT) and farmed animal 
sanctuaries (FASs).  
The first case illustrates how domesticated animals have transmitted to human 
their desire to “claims a space to run and to socialize … leading to new social norms, 
often with markedly better outcomes for both humans and animals” (2015a, 332, also 
see their 2011). This case is perhaps culturally specific to the West and its traditions 
of household companionship with ‘pets.’ Nevertheless, it is plausibly interpreted as a 
particular expression of non-violence philosophy in practice. Indeed, internatural 
communication with dogs results in their exercising political freedom (swaraj) by 
changing the norms for urban landscapes and planning. In terms of the purusharthas, 
not only does this promote the goal of political freedom but also pleasure (kama) 
across species lines: city dog parks promote kama for dogs and their human 
companions alike. That said, however, this case does little to engage the economic 
goal of non-violent wealth and power (artha) of primary interest to Gandhi.  
The second case, however, does engage the goal of artha. It is premised on the 
idea that therapy animals are often oppressed and exploited in their work relations 
with humans. Nevertheless, that this need not be so. Indeed, Donaldson and Kymlicka 
contend that “it is fully possible to create choice situations in which DAs can safely 
explore different types of work, and can then manifest their enthusiasm for some 
forms of AAT and their indifference or dislike for other forms” (Donaldson & 
Kymlicka 2015a, 332). Here, internatural communication promotes interspecies 
swaraj and kama, as well as artha.  ATT animals and humans collaborate in devising 
work norms that are meaningful to them both. Not only are persons with disabilities 
empowered to enter the economy, but also the animals become essential economic 
contributors, beyond providing milk, along with products derived from their carcasses 
on the event of their natural death.  
In their third case, Donaldson and Kymlicka critically explore experiments in 
FASs as “intentional communities” dedicated to rescuing “formerly farmed” animals 
from the agricultural industry. In some respects, this discussion echoes Gandhi’s 
attempts to reform traditional Indian animal sanctuaries (goshalas and pinjrapoles). In 
both cases, animals once farmed for their meat are extended protection and provision. 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s reforms of FASs, however, go a step further. Indeed, they 
stress the dependent nature of animal agency and the imperative of scaffolding their 
choices. Scaffolding begins with “safe and secure social membership” in the 
sanctuary, but then progresses to “new activities, experiences, and learning moments 
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… intelligible and meaningful” to the individual animals (Donaldson and Kymlicka 
2015b, 64).  While not uncritical of FASs, Donaldson and Kymlicka see them as 
important social experiments in ‘dismantling caste status for DAs’ (Ibid).  
In addition to these illustrative cases, Donaldson and Kymlicka in addition to 
other turn theorists (Smith, 2012) appeal to the representation of animals in more 
traditional spaces for public deliberation and political decision-making. Indeed, 
drawing from “existing models of ombudspeople or advocates,” they contend all 
“institutions which have significant impacts on animals could be required to have an 
animal advocate” (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 2015a, 333). Such an official 
representative would be “informed, in turn, by the input of human trustees responsible 
for soliciting and interpreting the subjective good of different animal individuals or 
groups” (Ibid). For his part, Gandhi offers no equivalent discussion of the political 
representation of domesticated animals.  
However, I see no in-principle reason why Gandhi, or a present-day Gandhian, 
could not accept this turn to the political representation of domesticated animals, as 
long as they grant such animals are not agents and participants based on rational and 
linguistic capacities. Gandhi’s civic national state includes multiple structures of 
political participation and representation from the smallest to largest units of units of 
civic activity (Parel, 2008, Allen, 2018). Here, the question is not whether 
domesticated animals should be represented.  Instead, it is how best to adapt the 
imperative of representing them to the particular multi-level political structures 
advocated by Gandhi. This is a question of policy, not philosophy. Reinterpreted 
through the philosophy of non-violence, domesticated animal participation --
including their political representation -- advances the various goals of the 
purusharthas.  
At any rate, I have argued the political liberation (swaraj) of such animals 
through their participation and representation in the mixed polity advances kama, and 
artha, as interspecies goals. To this extent, I contend Gandhi could make a political 
turn in animal ethics via the philosophy of non-violence. However, this still leaves 
moksha -- that is, spiritual as opposed political liberation -- which he claims is the 
differentia specifica of humanity. I ask next if the swaraj of domesticated animals is 
exclusively a means to the moksha of humans, or if there is also a possible Gandhian 
perspective on spiritual liberation as an interspecies goal of the purusharthas.     
 
V. Moksha: Need Animals Not Apply? 
 
It is commonplace for turn theorists to claim that animals can facilitate the liberty and 
even spiritual liberty of humans. For example, Smith (2012) argues that extending 
political representation to animals “is not only consistent with human freedom but can 
also further it” (Ibid, 123). She appeals to a short story by Alice Walker, I am Blue, to 
make this claim. In the story, Blue is a horse whose owner allows him the company of 
a mate for a short time until the mare was successfully impregnated and taken away 
again. When his owner takes away his companion, Blue is obviously distressed: he 
was “like a crazed person” (op cit., 124). Indeed, Blue gives Walker a look she 
reports is “so piercing, so full of grief, I almost laughed (I felt too sad to cry)” (Ibid). 
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However, Blue does not suffer because he is unable to communicate with his owner 
or Walker. As Smith puts it, he suffers because his “owner never had to consider 
Blue’s feelings in the matter:” Blue’s suffering is thus an “artefact of [human] 
domination” over animals (Ibid).   
The result is not just a breakdown of the bonds of community between Blue and 
his owner, but also with Walker as an oppressed black woman, a victim of racism and 
sexism. To be sure, Blue’s immediate source distress is his lack of companionship 
with a mate of his own species. Nevertheless, Smith contends that changing 
community norms to represent his interest in companionship with his own species 
could also open up new possibilities for companionship with humans. Hence, failing 
to represent this interest, Blue’s owner effectively deprived Walker of “what might 
have been a healing relationship with the horse … a source of companionship … 
important for her own self-development and healing” (Ibid). In other words, taking 
into consideration Blue’s interests and preferences in devising community term of 
interspecies cooperation could have helped to “restore community” (Ibid, 123) and 
belonging for Walker.   
Indeed, the friendship-that-might-have-been with Blue could have facilitated her 
deeper participation in a community fractured by oppression and disempowerment. In 
Gandhi’s language of spiritual liberation, this hypothetical friendship with Blue could 
have been a ‘drop in the ocean,’ expanding the ripples or circles of interconnectedness 
with other selves (atman), bringing her closer to an experience of Truth/God/Love. 
That said, however, Smith could have generalized her point about Blue’s potential to 
restore fractured human community to his owner as oppressor. If he had seen what 
Blue tried to communicate about his suffering, Blue’s owner might likewise have 
benefitted from a friendship with his horse, healing him of his insensitivity to the 
suffering of others, including minority women like Walker. In this respect, Blue could 
have facilitated the spiritual development and progress of both human oppressor and 
oppressed.  
Most striking in the present context, however, Smith does not generalize her 
point about Blue facilitating a restoration of community and belonging to Blue 
himself, as an oppressed animal. Presumably, though, Blue would be as much a 
beneficiary of restored bonds of civic friendship and co-citizenship as his owner and 
Walker. After all, his representation as co-citizen of the community would -- in 
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s (2015b) language -- create opportunities for him to 
experiment with “new activities, experiences, and learning moments … intelligible 
and meaningful” (Ibid, 64) to him, across species lines with his owner, Walker, or any 
others selves, animal or human, he may encounter, as co-citizen of the mixed polity. 
Adapting the language of Gandhi’s reinterpretation of the purusharthas, Blue is 
liberated to pursue his own individual experiments with Truth, thereby expanding his 
circle of interspecies interconnections, interrelationships.  
He is thus liberated not just politically but also spiritually to the extent this 
community establishes the general cultural conditions (Parel, 2006 and 2008) in 
which such experiments are an equal possibility for all of its member-species. Indeed, 
if I am correct, then Gandhi’s claim regarding moksha as the differential specifica of 
humanity must be rejected. Not only does this require a significant change in 
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Gandhi’s philosophical perspective, but also that of the political turn. On the one 
hand, Gandhi is called upon to abandon his hierarchical view of animal/human 
relations, embracing instead the view of such relations favored by Western animal 
liberationists and turn theorists alike of differences of degree and not kind. On the 
other hand, turn theorists are called upon to consider the spiritual dimension of 
political freedom, embracing the key insight of Gandhi’s reinterpretation of the 
purusharthas.   
Indeed, Gandhi’s philosophy is only enriched by embracing animal moksha. It is 
stripped of its least appealing aspect: its patronizing view of animals by comparison 
with humans (Burgat, 2004). Further, it suffers no loss as far as humans are 
concerned, if animal and human lives are empowered simultaneously, in restored and 
expanded community, through the intersection of different oppressions. As for the 
turn, it is only improved through embracing animal moksha in relation to co-
citizenship and representation. As I have shown above, Smith’s reading of I Am Blue 
is oddly incomplete without recognizing the spiritual benefits of such expanded 
community relations for Blue as well as Walker.   
Nevertheless, the situation is perhaps rather different, say, for an animal 
liberationist who does not embrace animal co-citizenship and political participation. 
For such an ‘old school’ liberationist, animal swaraj and moksha are hardly combined 
in a single Gandhian package of interspecies lifegoals, if animals are not political 
participants in the ways discussed by turn theorists. Nevertheless, even such a 
liberationist could find reasons to argue that Gandhi is wrong about moksha as the 
defining characteristic of humans over animals. For example, amidst videos of 
animals fighting, YouTube abounds with videos of oddball animal adoptions. Most of 
these involve domesticated animals: cats adopting puppies or rabbits, and so on.   
However, some involve wild animals whose behaviors, according to Gandhi, are 
governed by the ultra-violent law of beasts. Here, the veterinarian, Linda Bender, 
relates a wild animal oddball adoption story “so outlandish that few people would 
believe it had it not been filmed” (2014, 51) by a documentary crew. A female 
leopard kills a female baboon, but then desists from feeding on its carcass when she 
discovers an infant baboon still clinging to its mother’s dead body. Indeed, ignoring 
her ‘kill,’ the leopard proceeded to nurse the ailing infant baboon through the rest of 
the day and through the night until it eventually died of exposure the next morning.  
Nevertheless, one might object that this discussion sets the bar for animal moksha 
rather low. It assumes that spiritual liberation consists in experiments with expanded 
interconnections and interrelationships to others, reaching across the multiple 
boundaries of species, horse to human, cat to rabbit, leopard to infant baboon, etc. 
This expanding circle view of interspecies interconnectedness is not inconsistent with 
Gandhi’s conception of spirituality. However, it is surely incomplete. Indeed, one of 
the lifegoals of the purusharthas is religion and ethics or dharma. Gandhi assumes 
that individual experiments with Truth entail devotional (bhakti) engagements in 
particular religious traditions (Gray and Hughes, 2015, Lal, 2016), Hindu, Christian, 
Buddhist, Moslem, and so on. In other words, individual experiments with Truth are 
facilitated by many different kinds of devotional practices and observances. However, 
horses, cats, and leopards are neither Hindu, Christian, Buddhist, nor Moslem.  
90 MICHAEL ALLEN 
 
Journal of East-West Thought 
 
Animals are not inducted into analogical practices of religious discipline, 
voluntarily submitting to such disciple over time as they grow in spiritual insight. 
Indeed, animals often exhibit considerable self-discipline in their behaviors towards 
one another as well as humans. Wild sovereign animals are inducted into the norms 
and disciple of the pack; domesticated animals, like ATT dogs, undergo extensive 
training in self-discipline and restraint. Nevertheless, such processes of animals 
learning self-discipline and restraint are not equivalent to religious discipline or 
observance. In this respect, human devotional practices are similar to human political 
practices. Both entail linguistic capacities for corporate as opposed to primary agency 
(Carter and Charles, 2013).   
Corporate agency is the capacity to identify with all members of some relevant 
group.  Hence, the concept of human rights in Gandhi’s civic national state entails 
that its citizens have capacities to see themselves as members of the group of Indian 
national citizens across multiple levels of civic participation, as well as the citizens of 
all other states in the international order (Parel 2006 and 2008). Ultimately, all 
citizens can see themselves as connected to all others as members of humanity, even 
though they have never met and will never meet the vast majority of the other 
members of this group. Indeed, this is a function of the self-referential, indexical 
properties of human language, permitting generalizations from particular instances to 
all members of a group or class.     
Likewise, human religious observances entail capacities for such corporate or 
group agency among devotees. In Gandhi’s example of Hindu cow worship, the cow 
is a symbol for all suffering life. Indeed, by virtue of their linguistic capabilities, 
humans can grasp this symbolic meaning of the cow as indexical marker for all 
suffering. To this extent, devotional observance of the sacral character of the cow 
facilitates human spiritual growth (Jurgenmeyer, 1984) in Truth/God/Love. However, 
the cow is incapable of such corporate agency identifying itself with all suffering life. 
It is a primary rather than corporate agent. In other words, it is capable of primary-
level responsiveness to other agents within its immediate relational field, but 
otherwise incapable of corporate-level generalizations.   
Hence, on this analysis, the cow -- and all other animals without linguistic 
capacities for corporate agency-- is incapable of moksha. Indeed, the analysis appears 
to show that Gandhi was correct about moksha as the differentia specifica of 
humanity, after all. Nevertheless, liberationists and turn theorists would point out that 
not all humans, like those with severe cognitively disabilities, could qualify for 
moksha, on such a standard for leading a spiritual life. However, one might well 
object that the standard is unreasonably restrictive. Human persons with Down’s 
syndrome, for instance, cannot participate fully in the deliberative functions of 
citizenship, debating complex policy issues, or grasp fully -- depending on the 
severity of their condition -- abstract conceptions of universal citizenship and human 
rights, or, for that matter, their interconnectedness with all suffering creatures in the 
abstract.   
Nevertheless, they are still capable of expanding their connections to others 
within their immediate relational field. To this extent, on a more relaxed interpretation 
of Gandhian Truth/God/Love, they are capable of moksha. Indeed, if this much is 
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granted for humans with severe cognitive disabilities, then, by parity of reasoning, the 
same should be granted for animals, such as the horse, Blue, in Alice Walker’s short 
story, and the female leopard in Bender’s oddball wild animal adoption story. Hence, 
incapability for corporate-level abstractions is no disqualifier for moksha with the 
parameters of animal capabilities for agency. However, is this more relaxed 
interpretation of moksha for animals warranted? I see no reason why not.  
As I noted in the previous section, the political turn is premised on animal 
political participation departing from the ideal of an articulate agent satisfying a 
threshold capability for rational reflection, and corporate-level abstractions. If animal 
political freedom or swaraj demands a ‘new conception of political agency’ adapted 
to the actual capabilities of animals, then animal spiritual freedom or moksha 
demands a similar adaptation to a new conception of spiritual agency. That is, it must 
be premised on departing from any ideal of spirituality demanding equivalent 
linguistic capabilities facilitating corporate-level abstractions, excluding not only 
animals but also some human political participants and social members. In Parel’s 
(2006 and 2008) language for the purusharthas, such a new conception is necessary 
for ‘creating the cultural conditions’ in which all such participants and social 
members may undertake diverse experiments with Truth, in a political and spiritual 
interspecies community.     
 
Conclusion: the Purusharthas, Political and Spiritual Freedom 
 
Appealing to Parel’s reading of Gandhi’s reinterpretation of the purusharthas. I have 
developed a Gandhian perspective on animal liberation. The heart of Gandhi’s 
reinterpretation of the purusharthas is his embrace of political freedom (swaraj) as the 
means to spiritual freedom (moksha). Nevertheless, this perspective is ‘Gandhian’ in 
that it departs from Gandhi himself in crucial respects. It repudiates his insistence on 
moksha as the differentia specifica of humanity, instead regarding animal and humans 
as both subjects of spiritual liberation. Indeed, it extends moksha to animals by 
embracing the political turn in animal ethics. This turn goes beyond seeing animals as 
merely the subjects of negative, abolitionist duties to seeing them also as positive 
participants and co-citizens of the mixed polity. To this extent, it combines three 
types of freedom, applying equally to all suffering life, animal and human: (1) 
freedom from exploitation, (2) freedom to participate politically, and (3) freedom to 
grow spiritually. That is, freedom to grow through expanding community relations 
between different species cooperating with one another in realizing common life 
goals of pleasure, prosperity, and self-development. Further, the Gandhian 
perspective I have offered challenges Western animal liberationists and turn theorists, 
in particular, to embrace the latter goal of spiritual self-development. Indeed, I have 
argued embracing this goal, in an expanded and restored interspecies community, 
resolves a lacuna in political turn theory, as inconsistently attributing ‘spiritual’ self-
development to humans, but not animals.  
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